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Abstract
We examine a patient player’s behavior when he can build a reputation in front of a sequence
of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who
mechanically plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the patient player’s
action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputation effects can
refine the patient player’s equilibrium behavior.
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1 Introduction
Economists have long recognized that individuals, firms, and governments can benefit from good reputations.
As shown in the seminal work of Fudenberg and Levine (1989), a patient player can guarantee himself a high
payoff when facing a sequence of myopic opponents who believe that the patient player might be committed
to play a particular action. Their result can be viewed as an equilibrium refinement, which in many games of
interest, selects the patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff in repeated complete information games.
This paper studies the effects of reputations on the patient player’s behavior, which have been underexplored
in the reputation literature. Different from existing works that restrict attention to particular equilibria or games
with particular stage-game payoff functions,1 we identify tight bounds on the patient player’s action frequencies
that apply to all equilibria under general conditions on players’ preferences. The motivation of our approach is
to derive predictions that can be tested by researchers who do not know which equilibrium the players coordinate
on. Our findings also clarify the extent to which reputation effects can refine the patient player’s behaviors.
∗Department of Computer Science, Northwestern University. Email: yingkai.li@u.northwestern.edu
†Department of Economics, Northwestern University. Email: harrydp@northwestern.edu
1This includes for example, Bar-Isaac (2003), Phelan (2006), and Liu (2011). There is a separate strand of works that focus on
games with particular stage-game payoff functions and examine players’ behaviors in finite horizon games, such as Kreps and Wilson
(1982), Milgrom and Roberts (1982), Barro (1986), and Schmidt (1993). By contrast, we study players’ behaviors in infinite horizon
games with more permissive conditions on stage-game payoffs.
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We analyze repeated games between a patient player and an infinite sequence of myopic opponents, arriving
one in each period and each plays the game only once. The patient player is privately informed about his type,
which is either a strategic type who maximizes his discounted average payoff, or a commitment type who
mechanically plays his optimal pure commitment action (i.e., his Stackelberg action) in every period.2 The
myopic players learn about the patient player’s type by observing all the actions taken in the past.
We examine the extent to which the option to imitate the commitment type can motivate the patient player
to play his Stackelberg action. Theorem 1 characterizes tight bounds on the discounted frequencies (or frequen-
cies) with which the strategic-type patient player plays his Stackelberg action in equilibrium. We show that
the maximal frequency equals one and the minimal frequency coincides with the value of the following linear
program, which can be computed in polynomial time. Choose a distribution over action profiles in order to
minimize the probability of the Stackelberg action subject to two constraints. First, each action profile in the
support of this distribution satisfies the myopic player’s incentive constraint, and second, the patient player’s
expected payoff from this distribution is no less than his Stackelberg payoff. Intuitively, the patient player can
approximately attain his Stackelberg payoff by imitating the commitment type. In order to provide him an
incentive not to play his Stackelberg action, his continuation value after separating from the commitment type
must be at least his Stackelberg payoff.
The substantial part of our proof is to construct equilibria that approximately attain this lower bound when
the patient player’s discount factor is close to one. In order to calculate the patient player’s action frequencies,
we establish a discounted version of the Wald’s identity (Lemma A.5) that is of separate technical interest.
Theorem 2 builds upon Theorem 1 and identifies a sufficient condition under which a distribution over the
patient player’s actions corresponds to his action frequency in some equilibrium of the reputation game. When
the patient player’s Stackelberg payoff coincides with his highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete
information game (such as the entry deterrence game and the product choice game), our sufficient condition is
also necessary, in which case for every distribution over action profiles from which the patient player obtains
his Stackelberg payoff, there exists an equilibrium of reputation game in which the patient player’s action
frequencies coincide with this distribution. Our result implies that reputation effects cannot refine the patient
player’s behavior beyond the fact that his equilibrium payoff is weakly greater than his Stackelberg payoff.
2Our results are robust when there are multiple pure-strategy commitment types. We exclude mixed-strategy commitment types for
two reasons. First, as shown in Fudenberg and Levine (1992), the patient player’s guaranteed payoff in reputation games with mixed-
strategy commitment types can be strictly greater than his highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete information game. This
goes against our interpretation that the presence of commitment type is an equilibrium refinement. Second, commitment types that play
the same mixed action in every period are hard to rationalize using rational types that have reasonable stage-game payoffs.
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Related Literature: Our paper contributes to the reputation literature by examining the patient player’s be-
havior. Our research question contrasts to the ones in Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992) that focus on players’
payoffs. Our result clarifies the extent to which reputation effects can refine the patient player’s behavior in re-
peated complete information games studied by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990).
Existing works on players’ behaviors focus on games with a finite time horizon, or restricts attention to par-
ticular equilibria or particular payoff structures. For example, Kreps and Wilson (1982) andMilgrom and Roberts
(1982) characterize sequential equilibria in finite horizon entry deterrence game. Schmidt (1993) charac-
terizes Markov equilibria in repeated bargaining games. Phelan (2006), Ekmekci (2011), Liu (2011) and
Liu and Skrzypacz (2014) restrict attention to games with monotone-supermodular payoffs or 2× 2 games
and characterize the patient player’s behavior in some particular equilibria. By contrast, we examine infinite
horizon reputation games and characterize tight bounds on the patient player’s action frequencies that apply to
all equilibria. Our results apply as long as the patient player’s Stackelberg payoff is strictly greater than his
minmax payoff and the Stackelberg outcome is not a Nash equilibrium of the stage game.3
Ekmekci and Maestri (2019) study the common properties of all equilibria in repeated games between two
long-lived players in which the uninformed player chooses either to continue or to irreversibly stop the game.
By contrast, the uninformed players can flexibly choose their actions in our model, and the reversibility of
players’ actions is crucial for our constructive proof. Pei (2020) provides sufficient conditions under which the
patient player’s on-path behavior is the same in all equilibria of a reputation game. In contrast to our model that
restricts attention to private value environments but allows for general stage-game payoffs, his result requires
nontrivial interdependent values and restricts attention to games with monotone-supermodular payoffs.
Cripps et al. (2004) show that when the monitoring structure has full support, the myopic players eventually
learn the patient player’s type and play converges to an equilibrium of the repeated complete information game.
Their results do not characterize the speed of convergence or players’ behaviors in finite time, and therefore, do
not imply what are the discounted average frequencies with which the patient player plays each of his actions.
By contrast, we focus on games with perfect monitoring and examine the patient player’s discounted action
frequency. Our measure of the patient player’s behavior is continuous at infinity, and therefore, can be tested
by researchers who can only observe players’ behaviors in a finite number of periods.
3Our result requires an additional requirement, that the patient player has a unique Stackelberg action and the myopic players have
a strict best reply against this Stackelberg action. This is satisfied for generic stage-game payoffs given that the stage game is finite.
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2 Model
Time is discrete, indexed by t = 0,1,2, .... A patient player 1 with discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) interacts with
an infinite sequence of myopic player 2s, arriving one in each period and each plays the game only once. In
period t, players simultaneously choose their actions (at ,bt) ∈ A×B, and receive stage-game payoffs u1(at ,bt)
and u2(at ,bt). We assume that A and B are finite sets, with |A| ≥ 2 and |B| ≥ 2.
Let BR1 : ∆(B)⇒ 2
A\{∅} and BR2 : ∆(A)⇒ 2
B\{∅} be player 1’s and player 2’s best reply correspon-
dences in the stage-game. The set of player 1’s (pure) Stackelberg actions is argmaxa∈A
{
minb∈BR2(a) u1(a,b)
}
.
Let
B
∗ ≡ {β ∈ ∆(B)|∃α ∈ ∆(A) s.t. β ∈ BR2(α)} ⊂ ∆(B), (2.1)
which is the set of player 2’s mixed actions that best reply against some α ∈ ∆(A). Since player 2s are myopic,
they will never take actions that do not belong to B∗. As a result, player 1’s minmax payoff is:
v1 ≡ min
β∈B∗
max
a∈A
u1(a,β ). (2.2)
We introduce two assumptions on players’ stage-game payoff functions.
Assumption 1. Player 1 has a unique Stackelberg action, and player 2 has a unique best reply against
player 1’s Stackelberg action.
Since A and B are finite, Assumption 1 is satisfied for generic u1 and u2, for example, when each player has
a strict best reply against each of his opponent’s pure actions. Let a∗ be player 1’s Stackelberg action, and let
b∗ be player 2’s unique best reply against a∗. We call u1(a
∗,b∗) player 1’s (pure) Stackelberg payoff.
Assumption 2. u1(a
∗,b∗) is not a Nash equilibrium in the stage game and u1(a
∗,b∗)> v1.
Assumption 2 requires player 1 to have a strict incentive to deviate from his Stackelberg action in the
one-shot game, and can strictly benefit from committing to his Stackelberg action. This is satisfied (i) in the en-
try deterrence games of Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982), in which the incumbent’s
Stackelberg action is to fight potential entrants, despite its stage-game payoff is strictly higher when it accom-
modates entry; (ii) in the product choice game of Mailath and Samuelson (2001, 2006), in which the seller’s
Stackelberg action is to supply high quality, despite it can save cost by undercutting quality; (iii) in the monetary
and fiscal policy games of Barro (1986) and Phelan (2006), in which the government’s Stackelberg action is to
set low inflation rates or low tax rates, although it is tempted to increase inflation in order to boost economic
activities or to set high tax rates in order to increase tax revenue. Our assumption rules out coordination games
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such as the battle of sexes in which (a∗,b∗) is a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, and zero-sum games such
as matching pennies and rock-paper-scissors.
Player 1 has private information about his type ω , which is perfectly persistent. Let ω ∈ {ωs,ωc} in which
ωc stands for a commitment type who mechanically plays a∗ in every period,4 and ωs stands for a strategic type
who can flexibly choose his actions in order to maximize his discounted average payoff ∑+∞t=0(1−δ )δ
tu1(at ,bt).
Player 2s’ prior belief attaches probability pi ∈ (0,1) to the commitment type.
Players’ past actions can be perfectly monitored. A typical public history is denoted by ht ≡ {as,bs,ξs}
t−1
s=0,
which consists of all actions taken in the past and the realizations of public randomization devices ξt ∈ [0,1].
Let H t be the set of ht and let H ≡ ∪t∈NH
t . Strategic type player 1’s strategy is σ1 : H → ∆(A). Player 2s’
strategy is σ2 : H → ∆(B). Let Σ1 and Σ2 be the set of player 1’s and player 2s’ strategies, respectively.
The solution concept is (Bayes) Nash equilibrium.5 Let NE(δ ,pi) ⊂ Σ1×Σ2 be the set of Nash equilibria
under parameter configuration (δ ,pi). Since the stage game is finite and the game is continuous at infinity,
NE(δ ,pi) is non-empty for every δ and pi .
Existing Result on Equilibrium Payoffs: The reputation result in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) implies that
a patient player 1 can secure his Stackelberg payoff in all equilibria. Formally, for every pi > 0 and ε > 0, there
exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ , we have:
inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
E
(σ1,σ2)
[+∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ tu1(at ,bt)
]
≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε , (2.3)
where E(σ1,σ2)[·] is the expectation operator when player 1 uses σ1 and player 2s use σ2.
Inequality (2.3) unveils the significant effects of reputations on the patient player’s payoff. One can view
this result as a refinement, which selects among the plethora of equilibria in repeated complete information
games studied by Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990). In particular, let
Γ ≡
{
(α ,b) ∈ ∆(A)×B
∣∣∣b ∈ BR2(α)}. (2.4)
In a repeated game without any commitment type, the patient player can attain any payoff between v1 and
v1 ≡ max
(α ,b)∈Γ
min
a∈supp(α)
u1(a,b). (2.5)
4Our result generalizes to models with multiple commitment types, as long as all commitment types play pure strategies.
5Establishing the common properties of all Nash equilibria is a common practice in the reputation literature. Despite we focus on
Nash equilibria, the equilibria we construct can survive standard refinements and are not driven by suboptimal behaviors or unreasonable
beliefs off the equilibrium path. For example, they are also Perfect Bayesian equilibria and sequential equilibria.
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One can verify that v1 ≥ u1(a
∗,b∗). This implies that introducing a commitment type that mechanically plays
the Stackelberg action in every period selects equilibria in which player 1’s payoff is between u1(a
∗,b∗) and
v1.
6 In games with monotone-supermodular payoffs introduced in Definition 1 which include the product choice
game and entry deterrence game as special cases, v1 = u1(a
∗,b∗), in which case the reputation model selects
equilibria in which the patient player attains his highest equilibrium payoff.
3 Results
We examine the extent to which the option to build a reputation can encourage the patient player to play his
Stackelberg action, as well as how reputation effects can refine his behavior. We focus on the discounted
frequencies of the patient player’s actions. Formally, if the strategic type patient player’s strategy is σ1 and
player 2s’ strategy is σ2, then the discounted frequency of action a ∈ A is:
G(σ1,σ2)(a)≡ E(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ t1{at = a}
]
. (3.1)
In Section 3.1, we characterize the range of discounted frequencies with which the patient player plays a∗ in
equilibrium, i.e.,
inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗) and sup
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗) (3.2)
when δ is close to 1. In Section 3.2, we characterize the set of action frequencies that can arise in equilibrium.
3.1 Frequency of the Stackelberg Action
When δ is above some cutoff, there exists an equilibrium (σ1,σ2) in which G
(σ1,σ2)(a∗) = 1. For example,
σ1(h
t) = a∗ and σ2(h
t) = b∗ at every on-path history ht . Once player 1 plays an action other than a∗, his
continuation value equals his minmax payoff v1. Such a punishment is feasible since player 1 separates from
the commitment type after any deviation, and according to Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990), there exists
an equilibrium of the repeated complete information game in which player 1’s payoff is v1. This grim trigger
punishment provides the patient player an incentive to play a∗ given that u1(a
∗,b∗)> v1.
Theorem 1 characterizes a tight lower bound on the frequency with which the patient player plays a∗. Recall
6By contrast, reputation results in models with mixed-strategy commitment types cannot be viewed as refinements, since the patient
player’s guaranteed payoff in the reputation game can be strictly higher than v1 (for example, in the product choice game).
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the definition of Γ in (2.4). Let
F∗(u1,u2)≡ min
(α1,α2,b1,b2,q)∈∆(A)×∆(A)×B×B×[0,1]
{
qα1(a
∗)+ (1−q)α2(a
∗)
}
, (3.3)
subject to (α1,b1),(α2,b2) ∈ Γ, and
qu1(α1,b1)+ (1−q)u1(α2,b2)≥ u1(a
∗,b∗), (3.4)
in which αi(a) is the probability of action a ∈ A in distribution αi ∈ ∆(A) for every i ∈ {1,2}. One can verify
that F∗(u1,u2)< 1 for every u1 and u2 that satisfies Assumption 2.
Theorem 1. Suppose u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. For every pi ∈ (0,1),
lim
δ→1
inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗) = F∗(u1,u2). (3.5)
Since players have access to a public randomization device, Theorem 1 implies that the frequency with
which the patient player plays his Stackelberg action can be any number between F∗(u1,u2) and 1. When
players’ stage-game payoffs satisfy Assumption 2, the value of F∗(u1,u2) is strictly less than 1, which implies
that there exist equilibria in which an arbitrarily patient player plays his Stackelberg action with frequency
bounded away from one despite having the option to build a reputation.
For some intuition behind F∗(u1,u2), notice that the presence of commitment type implies that the patient
player can guarantee payoff approximately u1(a
∗,b∗) by imitating the commitment type. Therefore, he has an
incentive to play actions other than a∗ only if his continuation value after separating from the commitment type
is no less than u1(a
∗,b∗). This explains the necessity of constraint (3.4).
The substantial part of our result is to establish the existence of equilibria in which the patient player plays
a∗ with frequency approximately F∗(u1,u2). This is nontrivial given that player 1’s mixed actions cannot be
perfectly monitored, which implies that player 1 needs to be indifferent when he is supposed to mix. However,
player 1’s indifference conditions are not in our linear program. This raises the concern that these indifference
conditions may introduce additional constraints on players’ action frequencies. In addition, imperfect moni-
toring of mixed actions also implies that the patient player’s payoff from either (α1,b1) or (α2,b2) cannot be
attained in any equilibrium of the repeated game.
In order to illustrate the subtleties, consider the following game between a firm (row player) that chooses
its effort level and a sequence of consumers (column player) that choose whether to trust the firm or not:
3 RESULTS 8
– T N
H 1,2 −3,0
M 2,1 −2,0
L 4,−2 0,0
Player 1’s Stackelberg action is M. His Stackelberg payoff is 2, which is also his highest equilibrium payoff
in the repeated complete information game. Action profile (1
2
H+ 1
2
L,T ) belongs to Γ, from which player 1’s
expected payoff is 2.5. According to (3.3) and (3.4), the value of F∗ is 0. Theorem 1 implies that there exist
equilibria in which the patient player plays M with frequency arbitrarily close to 0.
However, the conclusion that the patient player plays M with frequency approximately zero seems to be at
odds with the result that he can secure payoff approximately 2 in all equilibria. To see this, suppose there exists
a history ht at which the strategic patient player plays M with zero probability at every hs  ht , i.e., only H
and L are played in the continuation game. The folk theorem result in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990)
suggests that his continuation value at ht is no more than 1, which is strictly lower than his Stackelberg payoff 2.
This implies that at every history where the strategic type plays actions other than M with positive probability,
he needs to play M in unboundedly number of periods after separating from the commitment type in order to
receive a continuation payoff close to 2. This requirement seems to be in conflict with the one that the frequency
of M can be arbitrarily close to 0.
Our proof, which is in Appendix A, constructs equilibria in which the probability with which the patient
player plays M infinitely often is strictly positive, but can be arbitrarily close to zero. We explain the main
ideas using the above example. Play starts from a phase in which player 2 plays T and player 1 first mixes
between M and L, and then mixes between H and L. If player 1 has played L too frequently in the past, then
the continuation play enters an absorbing phase after which player 1 never plays M and his continuation value
is at most 1. If player 1 has played H or M too frequently in the past, then the continuation play consists only
of outcome (M,T ), from which player 1’s continuation value is 2. The calendar time at which play enters the
absorbing phase as well as player 1’s continuation value at the absorbing phase depends on the history of player
1’s actions as well as his discount factor, which are constructed to provide him incentives to play his equilibrium
mixed actions before play enters the absorbing phase.
An important step of our proof is to verify that the discounted frequency of action M is indeed close to 0
as δ approaches unity. We establish a discounted version of the Wald’s identity (Lemma A.5) that bounds the
discounted average frequency of M from above, which might be of separate technical interest.
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Compute F∗(u1,u2): We explain how to efficiently compute the value of F
∗(u1,u2), which is a key step
toward applying Theorem 1. First, we show that F∗(u1,u2) can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 1. The program that defines F∗(u1,u2) can be computed in polynomial time.
The proof is in Appendix B. Intuitively, this is because for every (b1,b2) ∈ B×B, one can rewrite the
constrained optimization problem into one with 2|A|+1 variables, each taking value from 0 to 1, and 2|B|+1
constraints, which can be computed in polynomial time given that |A| and |B| are finite.
Next, we show that the constrained optimization problem can be further simplified when players’ stage-
game payoff functions are monotone-supermodular, which fits into a number of applications such as entry
deterrence, business transactions, and fiscal policies.
Definition 1. Players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular if A and B are totally ordered sets such that
u1(a,b) is strictly decreasing in a, and u2(a,b) has strictly increasing differences in a and b.
7
Let a be the lowest element in A and let b ∈ B be player 2’s best reply against a (if there are multiple best
replies, then pick the one that maximizes player 1’s payoff). Let
Γ∗ ≡
{
(α ,b) ∈ Γ
∣∣∣|BR2(α)| ≥ 2 and b ∈ argmaxb′∈BR2(α)u1(α ,b′)}, (3.6)
which is a subset of Γ that consists of strategy profiles (α ,b) in which player 2’s incentive constraint is binding.
One can verify that under generic (u1,u2), Γ
∗ is a finite set.
Proposition 2. If players’ payoffs are monotone-supermodular, then:
F∗(u1,u2) = min
(α1,α2,b1,b2,q)∈∆(A)×∆(A)×B×B×[0,1]
{
qα1(a
∗)+ (1−q)α2(a
∗)
}
,
subject to (α1,b1),(α2,b2) ∈ Γ
∗∪{(a,b)}, and qu1(α1,b1)+ (1−q)u1(α2,b2)≥ u1(a
∗,b∗).
Proposition 2 implies that in games with monotone-supermodular stage-game payoffs, it is without loss
of generality to choose (α1,b1) and (α2,b2) from a finite subset of Γ, which consists of strategy profiles in
which either player 2’s incentive constraint is binding or player 1’s lowest-cost action is played with probability
1. To understand why, suppose toward a contradiction that {(α1,b1),(α2,b2),q} solves (3.3), player 2 has a
strict incentive to play b1 against α1, and α1 does not attach probability 1 to player 1’s lowest action. Then
one can modify the distribution by slightly increasing the probability of a and decreasing the probability of
7This definition resembles the one in Liu and Pei (2020) and Pei (2020) except that there is no state that affects players’ payoffs,
and furthermore, we do not require u1 to be strictly increasing in b.
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other actions, after which player 1’s expected payoff strictly increases and the probability of action a∗ strictly
decreases.8 This contradicts the presumption that {(α1,b1),(α2,b2),q} attains the minimum.
We illustrate how to apply our result using the product choice game in Mailath and Samuelson (2006):
– T N
H 1,1− γ∗ −bN ,0
L 1+bT ,−γ
∗ 0,0
in which bT > 0 is player 1’s cost of playing H when player 2 plays T , bN ≥ 0 is his cost of playing H when
player 2 plays N, and γ∗ ∈ (0,1) is the minimal probability with which player 1 needs to play H in order to
induce player 2 to play T . One can verify that this example satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, and players’ payoffs
are monotone-supermodular once player 1’s actions are ranked according to H ≻ L, and player 2’s actions are
ranked according to T ≻ N.
According to (3.6), Γ∗ contains only one action profile (γ∗H+(1− γ∗)L,T ). Proposition 2 implies that:
F∗(u1,u2) = min
q∈[0,1]
qγ∗, subject to qu1(γ
∗H+(1− γ∗)L,T )+ (1−q)u1(L,N)≥ u1(H,T ),
from which we obtain that q≥ 1(1−γ∗)bT+1 and F
∗(u1,u2) =
γ∗
(1−γ∗)bT+1
.
3.2 Equilibrium Action Frequencies
Let
A ≡
{
α∗ ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∃q ∈ ∆(Γ) such that α∗ = ∫
α
αdq and
∫
(α ,b)
u1(α ,b)dq = u1(a
∗,b∗)
}
(3.7)
be the set of distributions over player 1’s actions such that for every α∗ that belongs to this set, one can find a
distribution over action profiles q from which player 1’s expected payoff equals his Stackelberg payoff and the
marginal distribution over his actions coincides with α∗.
Theorem 2. Suppose u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2. For every α
∗ ∈ A and ε > 0, there exists
δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ , there exists (σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi) such that:
∣∣∣G(σ1,σ2)(a)−α∗(a)∣∣∣ < ε for every a ∈ A. (3.8)
Suppose u1 and u2 satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, and u1(a
∗,b∗) = v1. For every α
′ /∈A , there exist η > 0 and
8Assumption 2 implies that a∗ 6= a in games with monotone-supermodular stage-game payoffs.
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δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ and every (σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi), we have:
∣∣∣G(σ1,σ2)(a)−α∗(a)∣∣∣ > η for some a ∈ A. (3.9)
According to Theorem 2, every action distribution that belongs to A coincides with the patient player’s
action frequency in some equilibria of the reputation game. In games where u1(a
∗,b∗) = v1, i.e., when repu-
tation effects select the patient player’s highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete information game,
an action distribution is the patient player’s discounted action frequency in some equilibrium if and only if it
belongs to A .
In terms of refining the patient player’s equilibrium behaviors for repeated complete information games,
our result implies that when u1(a
∗,b∗) = v1 reputation cannot refine the patient player’s behavior beyond the
fact that his equilibrium payoff is weakly greater than his Stackelberg payoff.
4 Conclusion
We examine the effects of reputation on a patient informed player’s behavior instead of his payoff. Our analysis
focuses on the patient player’s discounted action frequencies and characterize tight bounds that apply to all
equilibria in a broad class of games.
Our results imply that first, in games where the optimal commitment outcome is not a stage-game Nash
equilibrium, the long-lived player may play his optimal commitment action with frequency bounded away from
one no matter how patient he is. Second, when the patient player’s optimal commitment payoff coincides with
his highest equilibrium payoff in the repeated complete information game, reputation effects cannot further re-
fine the patient player’s behavior beyond that fact that his equilibrium payoff is at least his optimal commitment
payoff.
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A Proof of Theorems 1 and 2
Our proof consists of two parts. In Appendix A.1, we show that in every equilibrium, the discounted average
frequency with which a patient player plays a∗ cannot be strictly lower than F∗(u1,u2). In another word,
liminf
δ→1
inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗)≥ F∗(u1,u2). (A.1)
We then establish the second statement of Theorem 2 that in games where v1= u1(a
∗,b∗), any action distribution
that does not belong to A cannot be the patient player’s action frequencies in any equilibrium.
In Appendix A.2, we provide a constructive proof to the sufficiency part of Theorem 1 and the first state-
ment of Theorem 2. We construct a class of equilibria {(σ δ1 ,σ
δ
2 )}δ∈(0,1) in which G
(σδ1 ,σ
δ
2 )(a∗) converges to
F∗(u1,u2) when δ goes to 1, which implies that:
limsup
δ→1
inf
(σ1,σ2)∈NE(δ ,pi)
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗)≤ F∗(u1,u2). (A.2)
More generally, for every α∗ ∈ A , we construct a sequence of equilibria such that G(σ
δ
1 ,σ
δ
2 )(a) converges to
α∗(a) for every a ∈ A.
A.1 Part I: Necessity
Let ∆(Γ) be the set of probability distributions on Γ whose support has countable number of elements. Let
F(u1,u2,ε) be the value of the following constrained optimization problem:
F(u1,u2,ε)≡ inf
p∈∆(Γ)
∫
α(a∗)dp(α ,b), (A.3)
subject to ∫
u1(α ,b)dp(α ,b) ≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε . (A.4)
Our proof of the necessity part of Theorem 1 consists of three lemmas, which together imply inequality (A.1).
Lemma A.1. For every pi > 0 and ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ ,
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗)≥ F(u1,u2,ε)− (1−δ) for every (σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi). (A.5)
Lemma A.2. For every u1 and u2 that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, limε↓0F(u1,u2,ε) = F(u1,u2,0).
Lemma A.3. For every u1 and u2 that satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, F
∗(u1,u2) = F(u1,u2,0).
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Proof of Lemma A.1: The reputation result in Fudenberg and Levine (1989) implies that for every pi > 0 and
ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ ,
E
(σ1,σ2)
[+∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ tu1(at ,bt)
]
≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε/2 for every (σ1,σ2) ∈NE(δ ,pi). (A.6)
For given (σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi), let H
∗ be a set of on-path histories such that ht ∈H ∗ if and only if
• a∗ was played from period 0 to t−1, and σ1(h
t) assigns positive probability to actions other than a∗.
By construction, for every ht ∈ H ∗, player 2’s posterior belief at ht assigns probability at least pi to the
commitment type, and therefore, player 1’s continuation value at ht is at least u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε/2. Let M ≡
max(a,b)∈A×Bu1(a,b). For every a ∈ supp(σ1(h
t))\{a∗} and b ∈ supp(σ2(h
t)), player 1’s continuation value at
(ht ,a,b), denoted by v(ht ,a,b), satisfies:
v(ht ,a,b) ≥
1
δ
(
u1(a
∗,b∗)−
ε
2
− (1−δ )M
)
.
The right-hand-side is strictly greater than u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε when δ is close enough to 1. For every on-path
history hs such that hs  (ht ,a,b), player 2 attaches probability 1 to the rational type at hs, and therefore, σ2(h
s)
best replies against σ1(h
s). Therefore, (σ1(h
s),b) ∈ Γ for every b ∈ supp(σ2(h
s)). Let p(ht ,a,b) ∈ ∆(Γ) be a
probability measure on Γ such that for every (α ,b) ∈ Γ,
p(ht ,a,b)(α ,b)≡ E
(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
s=t+1
(1−δ )δ s−t−11{σ1(h
s) = α}σ2(b)
∣∣∣(ht ,a,b)]. (A.7)
By construction, p(ht ,a,b) has a countable number of elements in its support, and player 1’s continuation value
at (ht ,a,b), denoted by v(ht ,a,b), satisfies
v(ht ,a,b) =
∫
u1(α ,b)dp(ht ,a,b)(α ,b)≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε . (A.8)
The definition of F(u1,u2,ε) in (A.3) and (A.4) suggests that:
G(h
t ,a,b)(a∗)≡ E(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
s=t+1
(1−δ )δ s−t−11{as = a
∗}
∣∣∣(ht ,a,b)] ≥ F(u1,u2,ε). (A.9)
Next, we compute a lower bound on G(σ1,σ2)(a∗). Let Ĥ be the set of on-path histories ht ≡ (ht−1,at−1,bt−1)
such that t ≥ 1, ht−1 ∈ H ∗, and at−1 6= a
∗. Let p(σ1,σ2)(ht) be the ex ante probability of history ht under the
probability measure induced by (σ1,σ2). By definition, 1−∑ht∈Ĥ p
(σ1,σ2)(ht) is the ex ante probability with
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which player 1 plays a∗ in every period conditional on him being the rational type. Therefore,
G(σ1,σ2)(a∗) =
(
1− ∑
ht∈Ĥ
p(σ1,σ2)(ht)
)
+ ∑
ht∈Ĥ
p(σ1,σ2)(ht)
(
(1−δ t−1)+δ tX (h
t)(a∗)
)
≥ − (1−δ )+
(
1− ∑
ht∈Ĥ
p(σ1,σ2)(ht)
)
+ ∑
ht∈Ĥ
p(σ1,σ2)(ht)
(
(1−δ t)+δ tX (h
t)(a∗)
)
≥ F(u1,u2,ε)− (1−δ )≥ F(u1,u2,ε)− (1−δ) (A.10)
Proof of Lemma A.2: By definition, the value of F(u1,u2,ε) is a decreasing function of ε and is bounded by
[0,1]. Therefore, limε↓0F(u1,u2,ε) exists and moreover, limε↓0F(u1,u2,ε)≤ F(u1,u2,0).
Next, we show that limε↓0F(u1,u2,ε) ≥ F(u1,u2,0). The optimization problem that defines F(u1,u2,ε)
implies that for every ε > 0, there exists pε ∈ ∆(Γ) that has countable number of elements in its support such
that
∫
α(a∗)dpε(α ,b)≤ F(u1,u2,ε)+ ε and
∫
u1(α ,b)dpε (α ,b) ≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε .
According to Assumption 2, there exists a′ ∈ A such that u1(a
′,b∗)> u1(a
∗,b∗). According to Assumption
1, b∗ is player 2’s strict best reply against a∗. This implies the existence of α∗ ∈∆(A) such that α∗(a∗) 6= 1, b∗ ∈
BR2(α
∗), and u1(α
∗,b∗) > u1(a
∗,b∗). Let ρ ≡ u1(α
∗,b∗)− u1(a
∗,b∗). Since the support of pε is countable,
there exists α∗ε ∈ ∆(A) such that α
∗
ε (a
∗) 6= 1, b∗ ∈ BR2(α
∗
ε ), u1(α
∗
ε ,b
∗)−u1(a
∗,b∗)≥ ρ
2
, and (α∗ε ,b
∗) does not
belong to the support of pε . We construct probability measure p
′
ε ∈ ∆(Γ) according to:
• p′ε(α
∗
ε ,b
∗)≡ 2ερ+2ε .
• p′ε(α ,b) ≡
ρ
ρ+2ε pε(α ,b) for every (α ,b) that belongs to the support of pε .
By construction,
∫
u1(α ,b)dp
′
ε (α ,b) ≥ u1(a
∗,b∗), and therefore,
2ε
ρ +2ε
+
ρ
ρ +2ε
(
F(u1,u2,ε)+ ε
)
≥
∫
α(a∗)dp′ε (α ,b)≥ F(u1,u2,0). (A.11)
This implies that
lim
ε↓0
{ 2ε
ρ +2ε
+
ρ
ρ +2ε
(
F(u1,u2,ε)+ ε
)}
= lim
ε↓0
F(u1,u2,ε)≥ F(u1,u2,0).
Proof of Lemma A.3: The inequality that F∗(u1,u2)≥ F(u1,u2,0) is implied by the definitions of F
∗(u1,u2)
and F(u1,u2,0). In what follows, we show that F
∗(u1,u2) ≤ F(u1,u2,0). For every η > 0, there exists pη ∈
∆(Γ) that has countable number of elements in its support such that
∫
α(a∗)dpη(α ,b) ≤ F(u1,u2,0)+η and∫
u1(α ,b)dpη (α ,b) ≥ u1(a
∗,b∗). Let Γη be a countable subset of Γ that contains the support of pη . Consider
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the following minimization problem:
Fη ≡ min
p∈∆(Γη )
∑
(α ,b)∈Γη
p(α ,b)α(a∗), (A.12)
subject to
∑
(α ,b)∈Γη
p(α ,b)u1(α ,b)≥ u1(a
∗,b∗). (A.13)
By construction, Fη ≤
∫
α(a∗)dpη(α ,b)≤ F(u1,u2,0)+η . We show that Fη can be attained via a distribution
that contains at most two elements in its support. The Lagrangian of the minimization problem is:
∑
(α ,b)∈Γη
p(α ,b)α(a∗)+λ
(
∑
(α ,b)∈Γη
p(α ,b)u1(α ,b)−u1(a
∗,b∗)
)
, (A.14)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier. If constraint (A.13) is not binding, then the minimum is zero and is attained
by a degenerate distribution. If constraint (A.14) is binding, then for every pair of elements (α ,b) and (α ′,b′)
in the support of the minimand p∗η ∈ ∆(Γη),
α(a∗)+λu1(α ,b) = α
′(a∗)+λu1(α
′,b). (A.15)
Label the elements in the support of p∗η as {(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1. Equation (A.15) implies that for every αi(a
∗) 6=α j(a
∗),
u1(αi,b)−u1(α j,b)
αi(a∗)−α j(a∗)
=−
1
λ
. (A.16)
Let
u1 ≡ sup
(α ,b)∈{(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1
u1(α ,b), u1 ≡ inf
(α ,b)∈{(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1
u1(α ,b),
q≡ sup
(α ,b)∈{(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1
α(a∗), and q≡ inf
(α ,b)∈{(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1
α(a∗).
Equation (A.16) implies that
u−u
q−q
=−
1
λ
.
Let γ ∈ (0,1) be such that γu1+(1− γ)u1 = u1(a
∗,b∗). According to (A.16), we have γq+(1− γ)q= Fη .
Since ∆(A)×B is compact, there exist (α ,b) and (α ,b) which are limit points of set {(αi,bi)}
+∞
i=1 such
that u1(α ,b) = u1, α(a
∗) = q, u1(α ,b) = u1, and α(a
∗) = q. Since player 2’s best reply correspondence
is upper-hemi-continuous, (α ,b),(α ,b) ∈ Γ. Our analysis above suggests that there exists a distribution on
Γη
⋃
{(α ,b),(α ,b)} with at most two elements in its support that satisfies constraint (A.4) and the value of the
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objective function (A.3) is at most F(u1,u2,0)+η .
Take a decreasing sequence of positive real numbers {ηn}n∈N such that limn→∞ ηn = 0. For every n ∈ N,
there exists pn ∈ ∆(Γ) with at most two elements in its support that satisfies constraint (A.4) and the value of
the objective function is at most F(u1,u2,0)+ηn. Since
(
∆(A1)×B
)2
is compact, there exists a converging
subsequence {pkn}n∈N such that its limit p
∗ has at most two elements in its support, satisfies constraint (A.4),
and the value of the objective function is at most F(u1,u2,0). This implies that F
∗(u1,u2)≤ F(u1,u2,0).
Proof of Statement 2 of Theorem 2: Since v1 = u1(a
∗,b∗), for every ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that
player 1’s payoff in every equilibrium where δ > δ is no more than u1(a
∗,b∗)+ ε . Let
A
ε ≡
{
α∗ ∈ ∆(A)
∣∣∣∃q ∈ ∆(Γ) such that α∗ = ∫
α
αdq and
∣∣∣∫
(α ,b)
u1(α ,b)dq−u1(a
∗,b∗)
∣∣∣≤ ε}. (A.17)
Lemma A.1 implies that for every α ′ /∈A ε , there exist η > 0 and δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ and every
(σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi), we have:
∣∣∣G(σ1,σ2)(a)−α∗(a)∣∣∣> η for some a ∈ A. (A.18)
The conclusion of Theorem 2 is obtained since limε→0A
ε = A .
A.2 Part II: Sufficiency
First, we argue that in order to establish (A.2), it is without loss of generality to focus on solutions of the
constrained optimization problem under which constraint (3.4) is binding. Suppose the constrained minimum
of (3.3) is attained by {(α1,b1),(α2,b2),q} in which qu1(α1,b1)+ (1− q)u1(α2,b2) > u1(a
∗,b∗). Since a∗ is
player 1’s unique Stackelberg action, for every a′ 6= a∗, there exists b′ ∈BR2(a
′) such that u1(a
′,b′)< u1(a
∗,b∗).
Let r ∈ [0,1] be defined via:
ru1(a
′,b′)+ (1− r)
(
u1(α1,b1)+ (1−q)u1(α2,b2)
)
= u1(a
∗,b∗).
Consider an alternative distribution q′ ∈ ∆(Γ) that attaches probability r to (a′,b′), probability (1− r)q to
(α1,b1), and probability rq to (α2,b2). The probability of a
∗ is weakly lower under q′ compared to that under
q, and constraint (3.4) is binding. According to Lemma A.3, there exists a distribution over action profiles
supported on two elements under which constraint (3.4) binds and minimizes (3.3).
The above argument implies that the sufficient part of Theorem 1 is implied by the first statement of Theo-
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rem 2, which we restate as Lemma A.4:
Lemma A.4. For every α∗ ∈ A and ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for every δ > δ , there exists
(σ1,σ2) ∈ NE(δ ,pi) such that:
∣∣∣E(σ1,σ2)[ ∞∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ t1{at = a}
]
−α∗(a)
∣∣∣< ε for every a ∈ A. (A.19)
Our constructive proof of Lemma A.4 hinges on the following concentration inequality, which can be
viewed as a discounted version of the Wald’s identity. In the next lemma, we focus on the case that Zt takes
positive value with positive probability. Note that the other case is trivial since the sum is always negative.
Lemma A.5. For every δ ∈ (0,1), c≥ 0, and sequence of i.i.d. random variables Zt with finite support and
mean µ < 0, and Zt takes positive value with positive probability, we have:
Pr
[
∞⋃
n=1
{
n
∑
t=1
δ tZt ≥ c
}]
≤ exp(−r∗ · c)
where r∗ > 0 is the smallest positive real number such that Ez∼Z1 [exp(r
∗z)] = 1.
Proof. Let γZ,t(r) = lnEz∼Zt [exp(rzδ
t)], and let
qZ,r,t(z) = pZ(z)exp(rzδ
t − γZ,t(r)),
where pZ(z) is the probability mass function of random variable Z. One can verify that q is a well-defined
probability measure. For a sequence of random variables Zn ≡ {Z1, . . . ,Zn}, we have
qZn,r(z1, . . . ,zn) = pZn(z1, . . . ,zn)exp
(
n
∑
t=1
rztδ
t −
n
∑
t=1
γZt ,t(r)
)
.
Let sn = ∑
n
t=1 ztδ
t , we have
qSn,r(sn) = pSn(sn)exp
(
rsn−
n
∑
t=1
γZt ,t(r)
)
.
Since qSn,r is a probability measure, we have
E
[
exp
(
rsn−
n
∑
t=1
γZt ,t(r)
)]
= 1. (A.20)
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Let γ(r) ≡ Ez∼Z1[exp(rz)], we have γ(0) = 1 and γ
′(0) = Ez∼Z1 [z] < 0. Since r
∗ > 0 is the smallest positive
real number such that Ez∼Z1 [exp(r
∗z)] = 1, we have γ(r)≤ 1 for any 0≤ r ≤ r∗. Since random variables Zt are
i.i.d., we have
γZt ,t(r
∗) = lnEz∼Zt
[
exp(r∗zδ t)
]
= lnEz∼Z1
[
exp(r∗zδ t)
]
≤ 0
for every t ≥ 1. By substituting r = r∗ in inequality (A.20), we have E[exp(r∗sn)] ≤ 1.
9 Let J be the stopping
time that the sum sJ first exceeds the threshold c, we have
Pr [sJ ≥ c] ·E
[
exp(r∗sJ)
∣∣∣sJ ≥ c]≤ 1,
which implies that
Pr
[
∞⋃
n=1
{
n
∑
t=1
δ tZt ≥ c
}]
= Pr [sJ ≥ c]≤ exp(−r
∗ · c).
Back to the proof of Lemma A.4. According to Assumption 2, there exists α ′ ∈ ∆(A) such that α ′(a∗) 6= 1,
b∗ ∈ BR2(α
′), and u1(α
′,b∗) > u1(a
∗,b∗). Let a′ 6= a∗ such that p ≡ α∗(a′) > 0 and u1(a
′,b∗) > u1(a
∗,b∗),
and let b′ = BR2(a
′). Since a∗ is player 1’s Stackelberg action and a′ 6= a∗, we have b′ 6= b∗.
For given α∗ ∈A , let q ∈ ∆(Γ) be such that α∗ =
∫
α αdq and
∫
(α ,b) u1(α ,b)dq= u1(a
∗,b∗), and let ε1 > 0
be a small positive real number. Let Z1 = u1(a
∗,b∗)−u1(a,b) be a random variable that
• equals u1(a
∗,b∗)−u1(a
∗,b∗) with probability ε1α
′(a∗),
• equals u1(a
∗,b∗)−u1(a
′,b∗) with probability ε1α
′(a′),
• with probability 1− ε1, equals u1(a
∗,b∗)−u1(a,b) where (a,b) is distributed according to q.
One can verify that Z1 has finite support and E[Z1] < 0. Let r
∗
1 > 0 be the smallest real number such that
Ez∼Z1[exp(r
∗
1 · z)] = 1.
10 Similarly, let Z2 = u1(a,b)− ε1 be the random variable that:
• equals u1(a
∗,b∗)− ε1 with probability ε1α
′(a∗),
• equals u1(a
′,b∗)− ε1 with probability ε1α
′(a′),
• with probability 1− ε1, equals u1(a,b)− ε1 where (a,b) is distributed according to q.
Let r∗2 > 0 be the smallest real number such that Ez∼Z2[exp(r
∗
2 · z)] = 1. Let T1 = ⌈
M+c
u1(a′,b∗)−u1(a∗,b∗)
⌉ where
c ∈R+ is such that exp(−min{r
∗
1,r
∗
2} · c)≤ ε1.
9Note that when δ = 1, the inequality holds with equality, which is the celebrated Wald’s identity established in Wald (1944).
10Here we consider the case that the random variable Z1 takes positive value with positive probability. As will become clearer in the
analysis, the case when Z1 only has non-positive support is trivial. We made the same assumption for Z2 as well.
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In what follows, we construct an equilibrium when δ > δ with
δ¯ =max
{
ln(1− ε31 )
lnT1
,1− ε21
}
. (A.21)
• Play starts from a preparation phase in which player 1 plays α ′ and player 2 plays b∗. This phase
continues as long as action profile (a∗,b∗) was played in all previous periods.
• If (a′,b∗) has been played before, then the following strategies are repeatedly played for infinitely many
times, and we refer to each repetition as a stage.
1. In the beginning of each stage, both players follow strategy profile (α ′,b∗) for T1 periods.
2. If action profile (a′,b∗) is observed for fewer than T1 periods, then jump to Step 4.
3. If action profile (a′,b∗) is observed for T1 periods, play enters a random walk phase. Let T¯2 ≡
⌈ ln(1−ε1)
lnδ ⌉. For every integer t ∈ [1, T¯2], if player 1’s discounted payoff in the random walk phase is at
least (1−δ t)u1(a
∗,b∗)− c(1−δ ) and at most (1−δ t)(ε1u1(α
′,b∗)+ (1− ε1)E(α ,b)∼q[u1(α ,b)]+
ε1)+ c(1− δ ), both players follow action profile (α
′,b∗) with probability ε1 and follow the dis-
tribution over action profiles q with probability 1− ε1, dictated by the realization of the public
randomization device. Otherwise, the random walk phase stops and let T2 ≤ T¯2 be the stopping
time.
4. Both players follow action profile (a′,b′) in current stage until time T such that the discounted
payoff of agent 1 in current stage is (1− δ T )u1(a
∗,b∗). When T satisfying the requirement is not
an integer, let ξT ≡ T −⌊T⌋, players use the public randomization device ξ ∼U [0,1] to dictate the
continuation play. Both players follow action profile (a′,b′) if ξ ≤ ξT . Otherwise, play enters the
next stage.
• At every off-path history, player 2s have ruled out the possibility that player 1 is the commitment type,
and the continuation play delivers player 1 his minmax payoff. This is feasible given the folk theorem
result in Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin (1990).
In the above construction, the discounted payoff for player 1 in each stage equals (1− δ T )u1(a
∗,b∗), in
which T ∈ N is the number of time periods in the stage. This implies that the strategic type has an incentive to
play the mixed action in the beginning of the game to separate from the commitment type. In addition, one can
verify that player 1 has no incentive to make any off-path deviations, since his expected continuation value at
every on-path history is strictly greater than ν1 when δ is sufficiently close to 1.
A PROOF OF THEOREMS 1 AND 2 20
In what follows, we show that inequality (A.19) holds, which is sufficient to imply the desired conclusion.
Let E1 be the event that player 1’s discounted payoff in the random walk phase is less than (1−δ
t)u1(a
∗,b∗)−
c(1− δ ). Let E2 be the event that player 1’s discounted payoff in the random walk phase is more than (1−
δ t)(ε1u1(α
′,b∗)+ (1− ε1)E(α ,b)∼q[u1(α ,b)]+ ε1)+ c(1− δ ). First, the probability that event E1 happens is
bounded from above by the probability that ∑nt=1 δ
tz1;t is greater than c for some n≥ 1 where z1;t ∼ Z1 for all t.
According to Lemma A.5, the latter probability is bounded from above by exp(−r∗1 ·c)≤ ε1, which implies that
Pr[E1] ≤ ε1. Similarly, we have Pr[E2] ≤ ε1. Let E3 be the event that action profile (a
′,b∗) is observed for T1
periods, and by definition we have Pr[E3] = p
T1 .
We first show that Gσ1,σ2(a) ≤ α∗(a)+ ε for every a ∈ A. Let G denote the discounted number of times
action a is chosen from the beginning of each stage. By construction, we have
G≤ (1−δ T1)+ (1− pT1 · (1−2ε1)) ·δ
T1G+(1−2ε1) · p
T1δ T1+T¯2G+ pT1δ T1(1−δ T¯2)(ε1+(1− ε1)α
∗(a))
⇒ G≤
1−δ T1 + pT1δ T1(1−δ T¯2)(ε1+(1− ε1)α
∗(a))
(1−2ε1)(1−δ T¯2)δ T1 pT1 +(1−δ T1)
≤
α∗(a)+ ε1
1−2ε1
.
To interpret the above inequalities, the first term in the first inequality is the upper bound on the discounted
number of times action a is chosen from time 1 to T1; the second term is the upper bound on the discounted
number of times action a is chosen in future stages conditional on event (E1 ∪ E2) happens; the third term is
the upper bound on the discounted number of times action a is chosen in future stages conditional on event
¬(E1∪E2) happens; and the last term is the upper bound on the discounted number of times action a is chosen
in the random walk phase. The second inequality holds by rearranging the terms. By setting the parameter
ε1 ≪ p
T1 , the last inequality holds since 1−δ T1 ≤ ε31 and 1−δ
T¯2 ≈ ε1. Therefore, we have
E
(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ t1{at = a}
]
≤
∞
∑
t=0
p(1− p)t
(
1−δ t +δ tG
)
=
(1− p)(1−δ )
1− (1− p)δ
+
α∗(a)+ ε1
(1− (1− p)δ )(1−2ε1)
≤ α∗(a)+ ε .
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently small ε1 ≪ ε .
Next we show that Gσ1,σ2(a)≥ α∗(a)−ε for any action a. First we provides upper bounds for the stopping
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time T in different events. When event E2∩E3 happens, the stopping time T satisfies
(1−δ T1+T2)M+δ T1+T2(1−δ T−T1−T2)u1(a
′,b′)≥ (1−δ T )u1(a
∗,b∗)
⇒ δ T ≥
u1(a
∗,b∗)−δ T1+T2(u1(α
′,b′)− (1−δ T1+T2)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
≥ δ T1+T2−
(1−δ T1+T2)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
≥ δ T1+T¯2−
(1−δ T1+T¯2)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
(A.22)
When event (¬E2)∩E3 happens, the stopping time T satisfies
(1−δ T1)M+δ T1(1−δ T2)(ε1u1(α
′,b∗)+ (1− ε1)E(α ,b)∼q[u1(α ,b)]+ ε1)
+ c(1−δ )+δ T1+T2(1−δ T−T1−T2)u1(a
′,b′)≥ (1−δ T )u1(a
∗,b∗)
⇒ δ T ≥
δ T1+T2(u1(a
∗,b∗)− (u1(α
′,b′))− (1−δ T1)M− c(1−δ )−δ T1(1−δ T2)(ε1u1(α
′,b∗)+ ε1)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
≥ δ T1+T2 −
ε21 (1−δ
T1+T2)(2M+ c)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
≥ δ T1+T¯2 −
ε21 (1−δ
T1+T¯2)(2M+ c)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
(A.23)
Finally when event ¬E3 happens, the stopping time T satisfies
(1−δ T1)M+δ T1(1−δ T−T1)u1(a
′,b′)≥ (1−δ T )u1(a
∗,b∗)
⇒ δ T ≥
u1(a
∗,b∗)−δ T1u1(α
′,b′)− (1−δ T1)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
≥ δ T1 −
(1−δ T1)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
(A.24)
Let G denote the discounted number of times action a is chosen from the beginning of each stage. By
construction, we have
G≥ (1− pT1)(δ T1 −
(1−δ T1)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
)G+ pT1(1− ε1)(δ
T1+T¯2−
ε21 (1−δ
T1+T¯2)(2M+ c)
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
)G
+ pT1ε1(δ
T1+T¯2 −
(1−δ T1+T¯2)M
u1(a∗,b∗)−u1(α ′,b′)
)G+ pT1δ T1(1−δ T¯2)(1− ε1)α
∗(a)
⇒ G≥
pT1δ T1(1−δ T¯2)(1− ε1)α
∗(a)
pT1δ T1(1−δ T¯2)+O(ε21 )
≥
α∗(a)(1− ε1)
1+O(ε1)
.
The first term in the first inequality is the lower bound on the discounted number of times action a is chosen in
future stages conditional on event ¬E3 happens; the second term is the lower bound on the discounted number
of times action a is chosen in future stages conditional on event E3 ∩ (¬E2) happens; the third term is the
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lower bound on the discounted number of times action a is chosen in future stages conditional on event E3∩E2
happens; and the last term is the lower bound on the discounted number of times action a is chosen in random
walk phase. Finally, we have
E
(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ t1{at = a}
]
≥
∞
∑
t=0
p(1− p)tδ tG
=
α∗(a)(1− ε1)
(1− (1− p)δ )(1+O(ε1))
≥ α∗(a)− ε .
where the last inequality holds for sufficiently small ε1 ≪ ε . Combining these bounds, we have
|E(σ1,σ2)
[ ∞
∑
t=0
(1−δ )δ t1{at = a}
]
−α∗(a)| ≤ ε .
for every action a ∈ A.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let
B∗ ≡
{
b ∈ B
∣∣∣there exists α ∈ ∆(A) such that b ∈ BR2(α)}. (B.1)
For every (b1,b2) ∈ B
∗×B∗, consider the following linear program with 2|A|+1 choice variables and 2|B∗|+1
constraints:
F∗∗(u1,u2,b1,b2)≡ min
{α1(a)}a∈A,{α2(a)}a∈A,q
{
q ·α1(a
∗)+ (1−q)α2(a
∗)
}
s.t. q ∑
a∈A
α1(a) ·u1(a,b1)+ (1−q) ∑
a∈A
α2(a) ·u1(a,b2)≥ u1(a
∗,b∗)
∑
a∈A
α1(a) ·u1(a,b1)≥ ∑
a∈A
α1(a) ·u1(a,b), ∀b ∈ B
∑
a∈A
α2(a) ·u1(a,b2)≥ ∑
a∈A
α2(a) ·u1(a,b), ∀b ∈ B
This implies that F∗∗(u1,u2,b1,b2) can be solved in time polynomial in |A| and |B
∗|. The program that defines
F∗(u1,u2) can be solved by taking the maximum of F
∗∗(u1,u2,b1,b2) while varying (b1,b2) ∈ B
∗×B∗. This
can also be computed in polynomial time since there are at most |B∗|2 pairs of (b1,b2).
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